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I. INTRODUCTION
United States legal education needs to change. Simply stated, there is a
shrinking demand for the product we offer.1 At the vast majority of
American Bar Association (ABA)-accredited law schools, a large percentage
of graduates are not obtaining full-time, permanent employment as
This situation is partially driven by lawyer
practicing lawyers.2
overproduction—for the last several decades, the number of law schools and
law students has steadily expanded.3 At the same time, demand for
* Professor of Law and Director of the Center on the Global Legal Profession, Indiana
University Maurer School of Law. This essay is part of Pepperdine Law Review’s April 20, 2012
The Lawyer of the Future symposium, exploring the role of the lawyer in American society—past,
present, and future.
1. Lincoln Caplan, Editorial, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. Times, July 15, 2012,
at SR10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/opinion/sunday/an-existential-crisis-forlaw-schools.html?smid=pl-share (Lincoln Caplan, a member of the N.Y. Times Editorial Board who
writes about legal affairs, stated that, “A huge number of new graduates, if lucky enough to find
work, will not be employed in legal jobs that require passing the bar.”).
2. Id.
3. The number of ABA-accredited law schools has increased from 163 in 1975 to 201 in 2011.
See Enrollment and Degrees Awarded: 1963–2011 Academic Years, A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_th
e_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2012). Based
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traditional legal services has flattened and is now on the decline.4 There are
multiple reasons for shrinking demand, including legal process outsourcing,
more efficient work processes and staffing methods, automation, and flat or
declining real incomes of lower and middle class citizens.5 Clients are also
refusing to bear the training costs of junior-level lawyers—and with a
plentitude of skilled senior lawyers who are unable or unwilling to retire,
there is simply no need.6 As discussed herein, these changes are structural
rather than cyclical.7 United States legal education exists in the present form
only because of a system of federal student loans that is unsustainable, both
financially and politically.8
This essay may look like a conventional law review article, but it is not.
It is a strategy memo addressed to my fellow legal educators on how to
respond to a profoundly serious business problem. The demand for our core
product—traditionally educated law school graduates—is collapsing.9 The
legal market itself is undergoing a dramatic transformation.10 On the most
basic level, it is clear that law schools must become more attuned to legal
employers—we need professional employment for our graduates to keep the
doors open. Yet, legal employers are struggling to adapt to an environment
in which clients are increasingly opting for technology and process-driven
legal solutions that require less input from traditionally trained lawyers.
Creating more “practice ready” graduates will help some law schools more
effectively place their graduates in the finite—and likely shrinking—market
for traditional entry level legal jobs. Yet, this strategy cannot work for all
schools.
Stated bluntly, the legal profession is becoming a subset of a larger legal
industry that is increasingly populated by nonlawyers, technologists, and
entrepreneurs. Lawyers have a so-called monopoly on advocacy work

on the fall 2010 1L enrollment of 52,488, the largest on record, the spring 2013 graduating class will
likewise be a high water mark. Id.
4. See infra Part II.B.
5. See infra Part II.C.
6. Id. at 278; see William D. Henderson, Three Generations of U.S. Lawyers: Generalists,
Specialists, Project Managers, 70 MD. L. REV. 373, 387 & n.55 (2011) [hereinafter Henderson,
Three Generations] (“Clients are also refusing to pay for first-or second-year associates” (citation
omitted)).
7. See infra Part II.B–C.
8. For background on the law school financing issue, including the economics and politics that
caused the federal government to essentially take over the industry, see William D. Henderson &
Rachel Zahorsky, The Law School Bubble: How Long Will It Last if Law Grads Can’t Pay Bills?,
A.B.A.
J.,
Jan.
2012,
at
30,
32,
available
at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_law_school_bubble_how_long_will_it_last_if_law
_grads_cant_pay_bills/ [hereinafter Henderson & Zahorsky, Law School Bubble].
9. Id.
10. Id. at 35 (“The U.S. legal profession is in the midst of a broad structural transformation.
Meeting the challenge to compete in a global economy requires a higher-education policy that
honestly addresses issues of access, cost containment and national interest.”).
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before a tribunal and client counseling on legal matters, but that is of little
consolation. Virtually every other aspect of a legal problem can be broken
down into its component parts, reengineered, streamlined, and turned into a
legal input or legal product that is better, cheaper, and delivered much faster.
For the next several decades, this will be the growth sector for legal jobs,
although it is not preordained that these jobs will be filled by law graduates
or even U.S. citizens. Further, this is the sector that holds the most promise
of reducing the massive access to justice gap for the poor and middle class.
We legal educators need to decide whether we want to be a significant part
of this new and dynamic legal industry. If so, some of us need to retool.
This is a profoundly difficult period of transition for most U.S. law
schools. Many law professors are bound to have a visceral, negative
response toward curricular changes that will eat up our discretionary time
and push us away from an established reward structure and toward new and
unfamiliar subjects and teaching methods. We would prefer not to go on
this journey. The enormous risk here is that we use our well-oiled intellects
to resist unpleasant facts, such as the trend lines discussed in the body of this
essay.11 For many of us, the threat of our law school closing will feel
remote, abstract, or beyond our own personal time horizons. Further, the
greatest prerogative of tenure is autonomy. In our own minds, resistance to
decisive leadership can be justified as something noble and principled. Yet,
when making institutional decisions, as opposed to a closing courtroom
argument, great lawyers and leaders do not try to bend or shape facts.
Instead, they diligently collect all relevant facts and process them with
ruthless objectivity.12 Now is our time to do the same.
Fortunately, as I write this essay in the fall of 2012, a growing
proportion of law professors want to have a focused dialogue on possible
solutions. That is what I intend to offer here. I am offering one blueprint for
change. There are others. But, beware. If other alternatives seem more
attractive or less costly, they may be built upon flawed, unrealistic
assumptions. Let me be crystal clear on one point: we are making business
decisions designed to get our institutions to places of safety; we are not
making pronouncements of our social, political, or aesthetic values. As a
group, we have virtually no experience on the former, and entire academic
careers have enabled us to focus on the latter. We have to be honest about
our inexperience in making hard business decisions. Otherwise, we will not
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See JAMES C. FREUND, LAWYERING: A REALISTIC APPROACH TO LEGAL PRACTICE 127
(1979) (“[A] lawyer’s objectivity is his ‘most priceless asset’; when objectivity is sacrificed in an
effort to please, the advice is useless.”).
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obtain the desired results, such as a large volume of gainful professional
employment for our graduates. For our institutions to survive, the math has
to work.
We law professors make business decisions because we control hiring
and curriculum, which are the core elements of any law school strategy.
Many of the remaining business decisions are made by law deans, who
cannot govern without law faculty support. For the last 100 years, we could
make these business decisions without imperiling our financial viability.13
The wind was at our backs due to the broader growth and prosperity of the
U.S. legal profession and the rise of regulatory bodies that controlled the
minimum requirements of market entry.14 These fortuitous economic
conditions enabled us to focus primarily on scholarship rather than
innovation in curriculum or teaching.15 Those days are rapidly coming to a
close.16 We now need to exercise true lawyerly judgment to make the right
tradeoffs.
The body of this essay has two parts: a description of the problem (Part
II), then a proposed solution (Part III). Part II presents evidence of a
structural shift occurring in the U.S. legal profession—a structural shift that
is actually gaining momentum rather than subsiding or leveling off.17 It
discusses the principles that a twenty-first century U.S. law school needs to
follow in order to survive this shift. In brief, our students must obtain
knowledge and skills that are more valuable than their cost of attendance.
This is a market test passed or failed at the individual law school level. It
requires employers—legal and, increasingly, nonlegal—to value the
knowledge, skills, and abilities we develop over the course of three years.18
Prospective students will then follow, aided by a new wave of rankings
borne from the law school transparency movement.19 There is also a
political test: the federal government has to be satisfied with the rate of
repayment of law student loans.20
Part III is about building a curriculum that can reliably and measurably
transform motivated young people into the type of workers and problem13. For a magisterial history of legal education through the full maturation of the traditional
legal education, see ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850S TO THE 1980S (1983).
14. See generally William D. Henderson, Three Generations, supra note 6.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 387–89.
17. See infra Part II.B–C.
18. Note that I said “three years.” Changing the length of law school can certainly be put on the
table. But that requires a regulatory change and a protracted political battle. Discussion of this
“option” can quickly become an academic exercise; I have seen it happen dozens of times. If I am
trying to help my own institution survive, I would be focusing my attention on internal matters that
we control.
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 82–92.

464

07 HENDERSON SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[Vol. 40: 461, 2013]

2/13/13 10:17 AM

A Blueprint for Change
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

solvers that are in perennial short supply.21 Legal education has become too
expensive in time and money for anyone to accept the proposition that law
school quality is primarily a function of the test scores of the students we
admit.22 To justify our current price tag, a law degree needs to be a
transformative educational experience that confers personal and professional
benefits to students and positive external benefits to society in the form of
more capable leaders and problem solvers. To achieve this high bar, we
need to identify and articulate the knowledge, the skills, and the
competencies that we want to impart, and develop new systems to measure
and benchmark our progress.
I refer to this approach as a competency-based curriculum. It contains
five touchstone elements: (1) it identifies examples of professional
excellence in both the new and old legal economies, (2) breaks them into
discrete domains of knowledge, skills, and behaviors, identifying both
overlaps and distinctive feature of specific practice areas, (3) uses an
iterative process of theory and data to determine the best way to sequence
and teach these competencies, (4) measures the performance of the program
as a whole against a baseline (i.e., how well do graduates of this type of
program do vis-à-vis graduates of a traditional unstructured J.D. program),
and (5) continuously improves the educational process through feedback
loops. Further, for reasons specified in Part III, I believe this agenda can
only be carried out effectively by a consortium of law schools.
Although this new orientation is a change management problem,23 not
everything needs to change. I maintain that a portion of us needs to retool
(12% to 20%), another portion needs to serve our institutions by doubling

21. This is true in the new economy. See Matthew Bishop, The Great Mismatch, THE
ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 2011, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21528433 (reporting
evidence from the U.S. and abroad that, despite chronically high unemployment rates, skilled and
talented workers remain in short supply), as well as the traditional legal market, see Tom Hentoff,
The Secrets of Superstar Associates, 32 LITIG. J., no. 3, Spring 2006 at 24, 24 (noting that according
to partners, high quality associates are in “agonizingly short supply”).
22. Stephen P. Klein, Ph.D. & Laura Hamilton, Ph.D., The Validity of the U.S. News and World
Report Ranking of ABA Law Schools, ASSOC. OF AM. LAW SCHS. (Feb. 18, 1998),
http://www.aals.org/reports/validity.html (“[T]he student selectivity factor explained about 90% of
the differences in overall ranks among schools (i.e., percent of total variance). Since LSAT is the
major driver of student selectivity (and is highly correlated with UGPA), ranking schools on LSAT
alone will do a very good job of replicating the overall ranks US News publishes.”).
23. Any law school attempting to turn this corner needs to learn and implement the basic
principles of change management. See John P. Kotter, Leading Change: Why Transformation
Efforts Fail, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 2007, at 96 (articulating and explaining Kotter’s renowned eight
principles of organizational change); see also Fred Nickols, Change Management 101: A Primer,
DISTANCE CONSULTING LLC, http://www.nickols.us/change.htm (last updated Aug. 23, 2012) (an
accessible overview by a leading consultant on change management).
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down on what they do well (50% to 60%), and a third group needs to agree
not to obstructor alternatively, to move on.
II. STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND LAW SCHOOLS
Over the last few years, I have given dozens of talks at law schools, law
firms, bar associations, and various industry groups on the topic of structural
change affecting practicing lawyers and legal education.
These
presentations walk the audience through several decades of data. People tell
me that the topic is scary and depressing. I believe them. I have seen the
reactions on people’s faces and felt the emotion and tension that builds in the
room. Nonetheless, we need to deal with these trends to make good
decisions that affect our organizations and institutions. Some readers may
need no further convincing. They can skip to Part III, which offers at least
one plan for change.24 Alternatively, if you need facts and figures to
convince yourself, or to bring along your colleagues, some of the requisite
data are discussed below.
Section A articulates the principles of law school viability.25 I begin
with these core financial principles because they need to be in the forefront
of our minds when we begin Section B, which presents data on the
imbalance between the availability of traditional law service jobs (too few)
and the number of law school graduates (too many).26 Section C presents
data on a rapidly growing sector of the legal industry that focuses not on
legal services, but rather legal inputs and legal products.27 Law schools and
most practicing lawyers know little or nothing about this nascent sector—a
sector that is contributing to the decline in jobs and earning power of our
graduates; this is a knowledge gap that needs to be filled as quickly and
completely as possible.
A. First Principles of Law School Viability
The financial viability of law schools depends upon three interrelated
factors:
(1) A law school needs prospective students willing to enroll
(“students”).
(2) A reliable way to finance the students’ desire to enroll (“ability to
pay”).

24.
25.
26.
27.
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(3) Upon graduation, students enjoy enhanced employment prospects
and earning power (“professional employment”).
Among these three factors, the third is the most important: high quality
professional employment. Like water running downhill, the jobs attract
prospective students; and the reliable earning power of those jobs attracts a
method of finance. Without jobs for its graduates, any law school enterprise
will eventually fail. The students and financiers will wise up and abandon
the school and its faculty.
A focus on business factors is new for us. For the past two decades, the
market for legal education has been seemingly defined by a rankings
competition.28 We focused on rankings, or lamented their inaccuracies and
limitations, because virtually no law school was feeling pressure on the three
factors that make a law school financially viable. Now that the entry level
legal market has hit hard times,29 applicants are in much shorter supply.30
Yet, rankings are not irrelevant to our analysis. Rather, they raise shortterm strategy questions with no easy answers. Lower rankings affect
applicant volume.31 Thus, if a law school attempts to enroll the same size
entering class as prior years, and its peers cut their enrollment, it may drop

28. See, e.g., Rachel F. Moran, Of Rankings and Regulation: Are the U.S. News & World
Report Rankings Really a Subversive Force in Legal Education?, 81 IND. L.J. 383, 383 (2006)
(discussing symposium on rankings in which rankings were referred to as “the 800-pound gorilla of
legal education”).
29. See Karen Sloan, A Dismal Job Market for Law Grads Got Even Worse for Class of 2011,
NAT’L L.J. (June 7, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202558291685&slret
urn=20120820004951# (reporting that “not quite 66 percent of the recent graduates were in jobs that
require bar membership—down by 9 percent since 2008” and that “12 percent of the class of 2011
had part-time jobs nine months after graduating, when 5 percent was the norm during flusher
times”).
30. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Law School Applications for Fall 2012 Drop More than 15
Percent, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 20, 2012, 10:19 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
law_school_applications_for_fall_2012_drop_more_than_15_percent/. According to data published
on the LSAC website, registrations for the Credentials Assembly Service (CAS), formerly known as
LSDAS, has declined from 94,200 for the 2002–2003 admission season to 62,000 in 2011–2012.
See LSAC Volume Summary, LSAC.ORG, http://www.lsac.org/LSACResources/Data/PDFs/LSACvolume-summary.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2012) (published data in LSAC Resources Data). During
this same period, first year enrollment with the ABA has been nearly identical (48,400 in the fall of
2002 and 48,700 in fall of 2011). See LSAC Volume Summary, supra.
31. See Michael Sauder & Ryon Lancaster, Do Rankings Matter? The Effects of U.S. News &
World Report Rankings on the Admissions Process of Law Schools, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 105,
122–25 (2006) (using regression analysis to show that changes in rankings are closely associated
with the volume of applications to law schools, especially among high-LSAT candidates, thus
affecting school selectivity—another rankings input—and ultimately influencing the size and
direction of any subsequent changes in the U.S. News rankings).
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in the rankings.32 This may set in motion a downward spiral that creates
stiffer headwinds in the future. Yet, the alternatives are fraught with peril.
A school could hang on to its LSAT-UGPA input numbers by cutting
enrollment33 or handing out lavish scholarships,34 but this is expensive and
unsustainable. If applicant volume stays low or further declines, there will
have to be a day of financial reckoning in which layoffs and closure are put
squarely on the table.
In the current environment, there is enormous risk that law schools will
focus on the short term issues of enrollment, rankings management, and
tightened budgets.35 Yet, if we take that tact, we will not invest in a longer
term strategy for cultivating more employment opportunities for graduates.
As a result, the law school never gets to safer ground.
There are at least three reasons why a law school should muster the
energy and fortitude to simultaneously formulate and execute a long term
strategy focused on high quality professional employment:
(1) Market share. In an era of dwindling or flat law school applicants,
the schools with pipelines to jobs will take market share in terms of
applicants.36 And schools will need that market share to stay open.
My school or your school doesn’t have to outrun the bear, just the
other law schools. I am not stating my preferences here. My
preferences, and the readers’, are irrelevant. I am stating the
competitive dynamics that apply to a flat or contracting industry.
(2) No place to hide. We are living in era of heighted transparency. As
of 2012, granular law school-level outcome data will be posted
annually on the ABA website.37 These data, supplemented with
32. See id. at 125–129.
33. See Joe Palazzolo & Chelsea Phipps, With Profession Under Stress, Law Schools Cut
Admissions, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230
3444204577458411514818378.html (reporting that at least ten schools have publicly announced
smaller entering classes).
34. See Karen Sloan, It’s a Buyers’ Market at Law School, NAT’L L.J. (June 25, 2012),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202560485444&Its_a_buyers_market_at_law_s
chool_&slreturn=20120901180223 (reporting that some law schools are “sweetening their
scholarship packages” to lock in desirable prospective students).
35. See Recent Law School News Focuses on Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (July 5,
2012), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/college-rankings-blog/2012/07/05/recent-law-school
-news-focuses-on-rankings (“According to Kaplan’s report based on a June 2012 survey of Kaplan
Test Prep’s LSAT students: ‘When asked, “What is most important to you when picking a law
school to apply to?”[] 32% cited a law school’s ranking . . . .’”).
36. See id. (indicating that “U.S. News urges law school applicants not to heavily rely on the
rankings as the basis for where to apply . . . [and] to strongly consider cost, location, course
offerings, and job prospects.”).
37. See Class of 2011 Legal Employment and Underemployment Numbers Are in, and Far
Worse
than
Expected,
LAW
SCHOOL
TRANSPARENCY
(June
15,
2012),
http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/2012/06/class-of-2011-legal-employment-and-
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other information, will be used by entrepreneurs to create
benchmarks that will essentially test whether a school under- or
over-performs on its U.S. News ranking in terms of employment and
other measures.38 With information costs near zero, prospective
students will bargain hard over scholarship aid; thereafter, they will
vote with their feet. This is the mechanism by which schools will
gain and lose market share.
(3) Federal loans contingent on employment outcomes. Since the
passage of federal legislation in 2010, the Department of Education
has become the banker to law schools and all of higher education.39
Law students are financed under the same generous terms given to
doctors and dentists,40 yet their economic fates are diverging from
their doctor and dentist counterparts.41 For the last few years,
student indebtedness has gone up42 and entry level lawyer salaries
have gone down.43 If law students have significantly lower

underemployment-numbers-are-in-and-far-worse-than-expected/
(detailing
the
employment
outcomes published by the ABA for the class of 2011).
38. I know these entrepreneurs. There is money to be made here while at the same time
believing that you are helping prospective students. Law schools have long wanted to get rid of the
U.S. News & World Report rankings. New entrants will not necessarily make life easier for law
schools.
39. See Peter Baker & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama Signs Overhaul of Student Loan
Program, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2010, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
03/31/us/politics/31obama.html?_r=0 (reporting on federal legislation that eliminates role for private
banks in federally subsidized student loans); see also Henderson & Zahorsky, Law School Bubble,
supra note 8 (discussing history leading up to change in federal law and discussing current and
future implications).
40. At present, any student admitted into an ABA-accredited law school who has not defaulted
on federal student loans is eligible for Direct Plus loans originated from the U.S. Department of
Education up to “the cost of attendance (determined by the school) minus any other financial
assistance received,” as set forth by the U.S. Department of Education for professional school
education. See information on “How much can I borrow?” located on Plus Loans, FEDERAL
STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/types/loans/plus#how-much-can-i (last visited Nov. 10,
2012).
41. See Matt Leichter, At Last, a Rational Explanation for Why Law School Tuition Keeps
Rising, AM. L. DAILY (Mar. 1, 2012, 7:01 PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2012/03/
at-last-a-rational-explanation-for-why-law-school-tuition-keeps-rising.html (comparing Department
of Labor employment statistics and projections for lawyers, dentists, and doctors and noting that
market is projected to be substantially weaker for lawyers).
42. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 109–10 (2012) (reporting that average
law school debt has climbed from approximately $16,000 in the mid-1980s to $47,000 in 1999 and
to $98,500 for the class of 2010).
43. See Karen Sloan, Starting Salaries Continue Slide as Big Firm Opportunities Dry Up,
NAT’L L.J. (July 12, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202562736465&
Starting_salaries_contine_slide_as_big_frim_opportunties_dry_up_ (reporting on NALP data
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repayment rates than their professional counterparts (due to a much
higher reliance on income-based repayment programs),44 the
Department of Education, or even Congress, is bound to ask
whether it should continue writing such large checks to law schools.
The logical policy adjustment—already in place for for-profit
colleges45—is to make eligibility for federal loans contingent upon a
minimum threshold of graduate employment and repayment.
If a law school is performing well on professional employment for its
graduates, the threats of insufficient quality students and inadequate
financing mechanisms will largely fall away, or be less severe than for
competitors. This is why a law school, acute as the short term problems
might be, needs to build an infrastructure to deliver long-term employment
outcomes. But before we can better prepare students for a changing legal
marketplace, we need to understand for ourselves how legal work is
changing.46 If we are indulging false assumptions about the marketplace, we
are likely to execute a plan that is headed in the exact wrong direction.
B. The Decline of Traditional Legal Service Jobs
As a general matter, the economic engine of law schools has been
lawyers working in private practice. As shown in Figure 1 below, during the
first half of the twentieth century, the overwhelming majority of law school
graduates worked in this sector. Further, the vast majority worked as solo
practitioners or as individual lawyers in office-sharing arrangements.
According to a national census of lawyers drawn from the MartindaleHubbell directory (estimated to be 90% complete), there were 171,110
lawyers working in the United States in 1948.47 Among the roughly 152,600
working in private practice, 66.2% were identified as solo practitioners.48
Within law firms, roughly 40,500 were classified as partners, with the
remaining 7,500 positions composed of associates—a mere 4.7% of the
private practice bar.49 According to statistics compiled in 1947 by the U.S.
showing that the “median starting salary has dropped by 17 percent since 2009 . . . and the average
salary has decreased by 16 percent,” largely due to the collapse of large law firm hiring).
44. See generally Income-Based Plan, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/repayloans/understand/plans/income-based (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
45. See Kimberly Railey, Why Some For-Profit Colleges Could Lose Eligibility for Federal Aid,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jun. 27, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Education/2012/0627/
Why-some-for-profit-colleges-could-lose-eligibility-for-federal-aid (discussing implementation of
new “gainful employment” rules for vocational centers run by for-profit colleges).
46. See infra Part II.C.
47. See Albert P. Blaustein, The 1949 Lawyer Count: A Preliminary Statement, 36 A.B.A. J.
370, 371–72 (1950).
48. Id. at 372.
49. Id.
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Department of Commerce, the average law firm had an average of 1.64
members.50
Figure 1. Breakdown of Lawyers by Practice Setting, 1930 to 1970

Data Source: See RICHARD ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 299 tbl.37b (1989)
With such a large proportion of the bar working as solo practitioners,51
there was little expectation that law schools were responsible for finding
paid employment for their graduates.52 A 1950 survey of lawyers in private
practice inquired about the most important sources of help in finding
employment or making a start in practice.53 Nearly 80% reported personal
contacts followed by 47% from personal efforts.54 Only 10% of lawyers
reported law school placement offices as an important source of
opportunities, albeit only twelve of 102 surveyed law schools had
established a separate office for this function55—an enormously different
world than legal education in the year 2012.
In the intervening sixty years, the expectations of law school graduates
have changed substantially. As the economy has become more complex,
50. See William Weinfeld, Income of Lawyers, 1929–48, 29 SUR. OF CURRENT BUS., Aug. 1949,
at 18, 21.
51. See Blaustein, supra note 47, at 372.
52. See Weinfeld, supra note 50, at 19, 23–24.
53. See Louis A. Toepfer, Placement in the Legal Profession: A Responsibility of the Organized
Bar, 37 A.B.A. J. 497, 498 (1951).
54. See id. (“Organized placement activity seems to be a fairly recent development.”).
55. See id. at 499.
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interconnected, and regulated, there has been a massive surge in paid
employment for lawyers.56 Over the last three decades, lawyers working for
organizational clients, either as in-house attorneys or outside counsel, have
prospered the most.57 The primary driver of this prosperity has been a
relative shortage of sophisticated and highly specialized lawyers—a shortage
that has been cured by the rise of the large law firm.58
Figure 2. Total Law Office Employment, 1998 to 2010

Data Source: County Business Patterns (1988–2010), U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU59
At the same time the number of technically sophisticated lawyers has
proliferated, industry data suggest that the total number of jobs in private

56. See, e.g., Salary Trends—A 13-Year Overview, NALP.ORG (Sept. 2003),
http://www.nalp.org/2003sepsalarytrends (showing an 80% rise in median starting salaries for
lawyers between 1990 and 2002).
57. The financial fortunes of the lawyers serving organizational clients are magnificently
chronicled in the Chicago Lawyers I and II studies. See generally JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD
LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (rev. ed. 1994) (Chicago
Lawyers I); JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 99
(2005) (Chicago Lawyers II) (reporting that between 1975 and 1995 large law firms were the “clear
winner[s] in the market for legal services”).
58. See Henderson, Three Generations, supra note 6, at 380 (“As the size of the corporate bar
has expanded over the last several decades, the total volume of technically sophisticated lawyers
(specialists) is at an all-time high.” (citing William D. Henderson & Leonard Bierman, An Empirical
Analysis of Lateral Lawyer Trends from 2000 to 2007: The Emerging Equilibrium for Corporate
Law Firms, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1395, 1396 (2009) (describing an increase in the number
of partners and associates in large law firms over the past three decades))).
59. Generated by William Henderson, based upon data from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU.
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law practice has plateaued and may now be on the decline.60 As shown in
Figure 2, which is drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau County Business
Patterns dataset, the high-water mark for law office employment was 2004—
nearly nine years ago.61 As of 2010, total employee head count in U.S. law
offices has contracted by over 47,000 employees.62
Recent data published by the National Association for Law Placement
(NALP) reveal long-term trend lines that are profoundly troubling for entrylevel lawyers and thus, by extension, for law schools.63 As shown in Figure
3, the proportion of new graduate jobs in private practices has been on a
downward slide since the late 1980s. This pattern, however, is not
necessarily attributable to a corresponding shrinkage in the entry-level
market. Rather, it is likely due, at least in part, to a surge in supply.64 As
shown in Figure 4, during the same twenty-five-plus year time frame, the
number of ABA-approved law schools has increased from 175 to 201
(14.8%) and the number of graduates has risen from 41,000 to 49,000
(19.5%).65 With the supply of entry level law school graduates outstripping
demand, entry-level salaries have declined precipitously. For the class of
2010, the adjusted mean salary for a law school graduate was $77,333, a 9%
decline from the 2009 high-water mark of $84,952.66 For the class of 2011,
the market tumbled another 4% to an adjusted mean salary of $73,984.67

60. See generally County Business Patterns (1998–2010), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at
http://censtats.census.gov/cgi-bin/cbpnaic/cbpsect.pl.
61. See supra Figure 2.
62. The County Business Pattern dataset includes payroll and head count data for both lawyer
and nonlawyer employees, but the trend lines are likely the worst for lawyers. Other data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics suggest that lawyer jobs are trailing both paralegals and legal assistants.
See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK (2012), available
at http://www.bls.gov/ooh/legal/home.htm.
63. See Class of 2011 Has Lowest Employment Rate Since Class of 1994, NALP.ORG (July
2012), http://www.nalp.org/0712research.
64. Enrollment and Degrees Awarded, AMERICANBAR.ORG, http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_d
egrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
65. See id.
66. See Starting Salaries Re-Examined: A Critical Look at Averages, NALP.ORG (Oct. 2010),
http://www.nalp.org/oct2010adjustedsalmean (explaining the importance of using adjusted mean
salary data, which statistically corrects for the low response rate among graduates in lower paying
jobs; reporting adjusted means for every other year from 1999 to 2009); see also Salary Distribution
Curve, NALP.ORG, www.nalp.org/salarydistrib (last visited Nov. 11, 2012) (showing in chart format
the adjusted means for the classes of 2010 and 2011).
67. See Salary Distribution Curve, supra note 66.
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Figure 3. Percentage of Entry Level Jobs in Private Practice
1985 to 2011

Data Source: Class of 2011 Has Lowest Employment Rate Since Class of
1994, NALP.ORG (July 2012)68
Figure 4. Incoming 1L Classes ABA-Accredited Law Schools
1985 to 2011

Data Source: ABA Section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar69

68.
69.
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Figure 5. Employment Outcomes for the Class of 2011

Data Source: ABA Section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar70
Figure 6. Employment Outcomes by U.S. News & World Report Rankings

Data Source: ABA Section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar
Calculated by William D. Henderson (June 2012).

70. See Employment Summary Report, AM. BAR ASSOC. SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC.,
http://employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org/ (select class “2011” under “Compilation AllSchools Data” section; then click on “Download Complete Employment Data”) (last visited Nov. 11,
2012).
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As a result of the numerous lawsuits against law schools, the ABA
Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar has finally adopted
disclosure standards for law schools that make it virtually impossible to
conceal bad employment outcomes.71 Each employment outcome is broken
down by sector (private practice, government, business, public interest,
unknown), whether bar passage is required, and whether the employment is
full-time versus part-time, or short-term versus long-term.72 These data are
now published in spreadsheet format and available for download on the
ABA’s website.73
The outcomes for the class of 2011 are bleak. As shown in Figure 5,
only 55% of law graduates obtained full-time, long-term (FTLT) bar
passage-required employment nine months following graduation. Another
12% found professional full-time, long-term professional employment in
jobs that do not require bar passage or even a J.D.74 Not surprisingly, these
jobs generally pay lower salaries than bar passage-required jobs.75 The vast
majority of the remaining one-third of graduates are either unemployed or
underemployed.76 Remarkably, these numbers are probably optimistic. Four
hundred seventy-six members of the class of 2011 (over 1%) were hired into
FTLT jobs that were funded by their graduating law schools.77 Fifty-six
percent of these jobs were provided by law schools in the top fourteen
according to U.S. News & World Report rankings—i.e., wealthy, elite
national law schools. Eight law schools account for 72% (342) of all the
FTLT school-funded jobs, and all are top twenty-five law schools.78 All of
this information, on a school by school basis, is now fully disclosed.79
Although the elite national law schools are clearly faring better than
their non-elite counterparts, the breakdown in Figure 6 makes clear that the
employment issues are largely systemic to all of legal education.80 Outside
of the elite national law schools, between 30% and 42% of law graduates are

71. See 2012–2013 ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS, Standards Nos. 508–510 (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
legal_education/resources/standards.html.
72. See Employment Summary Report, supra note 70.
73. See id.
74. See supra Figure 5.
75. See Class of 2011 National Summary Report, NALP.ORG (July 2012),
www.nalp.org/uploads/NatlSummChart_Classof2011.pdf (reporting average salary of $81,050 for
Bar Passage Required versus $63,995 for J.D. Advantage and $66,547 for Other Professional).
76. See id.
77. See supra Figure 5.
78. See supra Figure 5.
79. Readers can look at the names of the law schools themselves. I am not calling them out.
There is no moral high ground here.
80. See supra Figure 6.
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failing to obtain permanent employment following graduation.81 In short,
this is an industry-wide crisis.
I use the word “crisis” with some trepidation. Unfortunately, the word
fits. As chronicled by Brian Tamanaha in his important book, Failing Law
Schools, the collapse in both jobs and earning power of law school graduates
coincides with a relentless increase in student debt.82 Average law school
debt has more than doubled between 1999 and 2010, rising from $47,000 to
$98,500.83 When the average undergraduate debt is factored in (over
$25,000 per student borrower), the total educational burden for the average
borrower rises to nearly $125,000.84 Further, many law schools have
average debt loads much higher than the overall average.85 And within most
law schools, there are students with $150,000 to $300,000 of total
educational debt.86
As Professor Tamanaha ably demonstrates, in the current job market,
many if not most law graduates have very little prospect of even keeping up
with, much less paying off, their educational debt.87 Eventually, a
substantial portion of these educational funds will be written off through
either uncollectable student defaults or loan forgiveness through the Federal
Government Income-Based Repayment (IBR) or Public Service Programs.88
These two programs effectively cap repayment obligations according to a
formula based on a borrower’s income; they also waive any payment at all if
a borrower falls below a minimum income threshold.89 Yet, when borrowers
are unable to keep up with their interest payments, total indebtedness grows
through a process called “negative amortization.”90 Thus, the law school

81. See supra Figure 6.
82. See TAMANAHA, supra note 42, at 101–25.
83. See id. at 109–10.
84. See id. at 109–11.
85. See id. at 110–11 (reporting twenty-two law schools with the highest law school debt loads,
ranging from $123,025 to $145,621).
86. See Jim Chen, A Degree of Practical Wisdom: The Ratio of Educational Debt to Income as a
Basic Measurement of Law School Graduates’ Economic Viability, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1185, 1200 (2012) (noting that, “Law student debt varies widely. . . . [P]rivate law school[] . . .
graduates routinely incur $100,000 or more in law school debt alone.”).
87. See TAMANAHA, supra note 42, at 107–25.
88. See id. at 124.
89. The formula is “15 percent of the difference between your AGI [adjusted gross income] and
150 percent of the Department of Health and Human Services Poverty Guideline for your family size
and state.” See Income-Based Repayment Plan for the Direct Loan and FFEL Programs, FEDERAL
STUDENT AID, available at http://studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/income-based-repayment.pdf
(last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
90. See Letter from Professor Deborah Jones Merritt, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State
University, to Dean John F. O’Brien, Chair, Council and Accreditation Committee, ABA Section of
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graduates who have failed to receive a boost in income have the potential—
and for many, the likelihood—of being dogged by their law school debt for
decades. This creates a highly volatile political and economic issue that will
likely grow over time.
When the federal government is experiencing lower levels of repayment
for law school graduates,91 and the graduates themselves are complaining
about the terms of the loans, what is the likelihood that the federal
government will continue to issue a blank check to U.S. law schools? The
federal government’s lending for legal education is premised on the belief
that a law degree enhances a recipient’s human capital, and surely that is
true. But at what cost? At today’s tuition rates and levels of student
indebtedness, it is possible that for many students the value of a law degree
is not worth the cost.92 Let me summarize so that I am not misinterpreted:
Our current legal education is likely to enhance the human capital of our
students, but in the emerging economic environment, the benefits of that
education are insufficient to pay back its cost. We may believe that our own
institutions offer a very good legal education. But, that is not the issue here.
The issue is whether the education we offer is able to adapt to the rapidly
changing legal industry.
The value of the law degree is cast into doubt by two factors. First, the
traditional engine of law school economics—lawyers working in private
practice—has plateaued.93 Second, the number of law schools has
proliferated and continues to churn out near record numbers of law
graduates. Even with the benefit of generous federal financing—an
assumption that may not hold—law schools will continue to experience
uncomfortable levels of competition trying to fill their seats, and, in turn,
will have difficulty finding their graduates meaningful professional
employment. This pressure will produce higher levels of both failure and
innovation.

Legal Education and Admission to the Bar 2 (Nov. 14, 2011), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/legal_education/committees/stan
dards_review_documents/20111116_comment_general_s510_deborah_merritt.authcheckdam.pdf
(discussing the “negative amortization” as one of the consequences of the current system of higher
tuition and student debt combined with stagnant incomes).
91. Id. at 124.
92. Several recent articles explore this question. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 86, at 1201–04
(calculating out the income needed by a law student to capably handle various levels of educational
debt and concluding that comfortable levels of debt and current tuition rates require incomes of
$96,000 to $288,000 per year); see also Herwig Schlunk, Mamas 2011: Is a Law Degree a Good
Investment Today? 19–20 (Vand. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 11-42, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1957139 (calculating, after factoring in opportunity costs based on
undergraduate prospects, that law school in the current economic climate is a bad economic
investment for over two-thirds of law graduates).
93. See Nathan Koppel, Bar Raised for Law-Grad Jobs, WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704866204575224350917718446.html.
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C. Susskind’s World: The Rise of Legal Inputs and Legal Products
Things are getting tougher for law schools because we train our
graduates for the legal services market. Yet, the legal services market is
gradually being upended by new entrants who are offering legal inputs and
legal products to law firms, legal departments, and average citizens.94 The
principal attraction behind a legal input or a legal product is very simple:
technology or a better-designed process is reducing the need for expensive,
artisan-trained lawyers.95 In many cases, by removing the lawyer from the
value chain, cost goes down, quality goes up, and service delivery time
becomes faster.96
This is a paradigm shift. The best commentator on this shift is Richard
Susskind, the British lawyer, technology expert, and futurist.97 In his 2008
book, The End of Lawyers?,98 Susskind introduced a framework, shown in
Figure 7, that describes the evolution of the legal industry.99 Along a
continuum that moves left to right, Susskind asserts that legal work is
gradually migrating from bespoke (e.g., court room practice), to
standardized (e.g., form documents for a merger), to systematized (e.g., a
document-assembly system for estate planning), to packaged (e.g., a turnkey regulatory compliance program), to commoditized (e.g., any IT-based
legal product that is undifferentiated in a market with many competitors).100
These changes are made possible by identifying recursive patterns in legal
94. See RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? 9–10 (2010) [hereinafter SUSSKIND, THE
END OF LAWYERS?].
95. Id. at 11.
96. Id.
97. Susskind has a strong track record predicting the future of the legal profession. In 1996,
Susskind predicted that lawyers and their clients would soon communicate by e-mail. Senior
officials at the Law Society urged that Susskind not be allowed to speak in public because “the
feeling was that I had failed to understand confidentiality and was bringing the profession into
disrepute.” See Richard Susskind, Does the Law Society Know that There’s an Internet Generation,
TIMESONLINE (London) (May 13, 2010), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/law/article2509518.ece.
98. See SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?, supra note 94.
99. Id. at 29. At the time of publication, I learned that Richard Susskind's new book,
TOMORROW'S LAWYERS (Oxford 2013) would be released within the month. Richard was kind
enough to share a pre-publication manuscript. It is lucid account of a revolution that is well
underway. The first two paragraphs read:
This is book is a short introduction to the future for young and aspiring lawyers.
Tomorrow's legal world, as predicted and described here, bears little resemblance to
that of the past. Legal institutions and lawyers are at a crossroads, I claim, and are poised
to change more radically over the next two decades than they have over the last two
centuries. If you are a young lawyer, this revolution will happen on your watch.
RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW'S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE (forthcoming
2013).
100. See id. at 28–33.
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forms and judicial opinions, which enables the use of process and
technology to routinize and scale very cheap and very high quality solutions
to the myriad of legal needs.101
Figure 7. Richard Susskind’s Evolution of Legal Industry102

Lawyers, of course, are quite frightened by the paradigm shift. So,
according to Susskind, their natural reaction is double-down on the
“bespoke” work and claim that this artisan craft is a specialty.103 One
problem with this reaction is that it is shared universally by nearly all
lawyers.104 Clients do not want to pay a lot of money for their legal solution;
thus, they are leading the relentless “pull to the right.”105 More significantly,
there is more money outside of the shrinking quantity of bespoke legal
work.106 As Susskind points out, the greatest profit-making opportunities are
lodged between the systemized and packaged parts of the continuum.107 If
an organization can continuously innovate and create systematized or
packaged solutions to legal issues and problems that can be sold over and
over again to a large base of clients, the organization can enjoy the prospect
of “making money while you sleep.”108
When I first heard Richard Susskind speak in 2009 (shortly after the
publication of his book) and then subsequently read his book, I found his
model intellectually coherent and, at a theoretical level, highly cogent. But
on a practical level, the ideas seemed abstract. Who were these new legal
entrepreneurs? And what were the products and services they are offering?
I am an academic, so I was content that I found an interesting intellectual
puzzle. And that was it.
Susskind’s model became less abstract during the summer of 2010 when
I examined data from the U.S. Census Bureau County Business Patterns

101. Id. at 6.
102. Id. at 29.
103. Id. at 34.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 35 (“If the clients’ pull away from bespoke service were not sufficient to incline law
firms rightwards, then the prospect of competitors driving in that direction should surely give pause
for thought.”).
106. Id. at 37–38.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 37.
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dataset.109 One of the Census Bureau’s duties is to create and maintain a
taxonomy of the nation’s economic activity and use it to track employer
type, payroll data, and geographic location.110 The nature and composition
of economic activity continuously evolves, so every few decades the entire
classification system needs to be replaced. This last happened in 1997,
when the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS)
supplanted the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system.111 The
economic trends I observed in the summer of 2010 (limited to data through
2008, as the data has a two year lag) got my attention. Since then, the
troubling pattern has only become more pronounced.
Consider the following. The NAICS code for legal services is 5411.112
In 2010, this sector employed 1,172,748 employees (as of March 15,
2010).113 Of these workers, 91.7% are employed in law offices (NAICS
54111), which is down from 94.2% in 1998.114 The second biggest category
in the 5411 category is Title Abstract and Settlement Offices (NAICS
541191), which is driven by the requirement in some states that lawyers
participate in real estate closing. This subsector employed 69,399 in 2010—
down from the 85,759 high-water market in 2006, which is a clear fallout
from the real estate bubble that nearly took down the entire U.S. economy.
The only other 5411 subsector is the catch-all “All Other Legal Services”
(NAICS 541199).115 This subsector has steadily grown from 9,800 workers
in 1998 to 23,504 workers in 2010.

109. See generally County Business Patterns, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at
http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
110. Id.
111. See North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
available at http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
112. A reference table to NAICS codes is available at http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/
(follow “2012 NAICS Structure” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
113. See County Business Patterns, supra note 109 (follow the hyperlink to specific year).
114. Id.
115. See NAICS codes, supra note 112.
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Figure 8. Change in Number of Employees in Legal Service Industry Since
1998, Law Offices vs. All Other Legal Services

Figure 8 above plots the percentage growth in “Offices of Lawyers”
versus “All Other Legal Services.”116 The Offices of Lawyers trendline is
the same one shown in Figure 2.117 This reveals 2004 as the high-water
mark for law office employment.118 Again, the total employment decline has
been roughly 48,000 workers.119 Yet, since 2004, the All Other Legal
Services group has grown by nearly 8,000.120 The average job in a law
office pays $80,000 versus $46,000 in All Other Legal Services.121 But the
most striking feature is the rate of growth, which averages 8.5% a year. In
1998, All Other Legal Services comprised 0.9% of 5411. As of 2010, the
percentage had increased to 2.2%—and at the time of this writing, these data
are 2.5 years old.
What companies comprise the 541199 subsector? Because County
Business Patterns data include payroll and headcount information, which is
information that a company would like to withhold from rivals, it is

116. See supra Figure 8.
117. See supra Figure 2.
118. See supra Figure 8.
119. See supra Figure 8.
120. See supra Figure 8.
121. Calculations made by author from U.S. County Business Patterns data. I divided total
payroll by the number of employees in each subsector.
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anonymous and aggregated at the county level.122 As a result, we don’t
know the identities of these companies. But we do know that the following
states have at least one All Other Legal Services employer, employing
between 500 and 999 workers: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Missouri, New
York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.123 Likewise, in the 100 to 499 employee
range, California has eight employers; Florida, Illinois, and Texas have two;
and Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania each have one.124 The states with the biggest All Other Legal
Service payrolls are California ($201 million, 4,222 employees, 553
establishments), followed by Florida ($125 Million, 2,925 employers, 697
establishments) and New York ($113 million, 2,501 employees, 297
establishments).125
As someone who purportedly studies the legal industry, I know
embarrassingly little about this burgeoning subsector. That said, these
companies could be the very vendors that Susskind described in The End of
Lawyers? The following questions jump immediately to mind:
• Who are these employers?
• What services and products are they providing?
• Why are they growing so quickly?
• What is the connection between the flat office employment
figures and growth in this sector?
Based on my readings and monitoring of the legal industry, my best
assessment is that some substantial portion of these companies are contract
registry services that assemble contract attorneys for large electronic
discovery and due diligence projects. One of the biggest is Robert Half,
which has twenty-six locations throughout the United States and Canada.126

122. This information is withheld at the county level when it would functionally reveal
competitive information on specific employers.
123. See County Business Patterns, supra note 109 (follow link for each specific state) (last
visited Sept. 30, 2012).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Robert Half’s description of their services: “We place lawyers, paralegals, law clerks and
legal support professionals on a temporary, project and full-time basis in high-demand practice
areas. We also provide project teams, along with dedicated space and high-tech resources, for a
wide range of initiatives including litigation support, M&A review and discovery matters.” About
Us, ROBERT HALF LEGAL, http://www.roberthalflegal.com/AboutUs (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
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Robert Half is owned by Robert Half International, which is a public
company traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE symbol: RHI).127
The SEC filings do not break out information on their legal services
business. Similarly, a competitor of Robert Half is Special Counsel, which
“places attorneys, paralegals . . . and legal support personnel on a temporary,
temporary-to-direct hire, and direct hire basis into law firms and corporate
legal departments.”128 Special Counsel is owned by Adecco Group North
America,129 which is a subsidiary of Adecco Group. Adecco Group is listed
on the SIX Swiss Exchange (symbol: ADEN).130 Again, because of the size
of the corporate parent, financials for Special Counsel are not disclosed.
That said, Special Counsel now has thirty-six offices in the United States.131
As substantial as these contract attorney registry companies appear, they
are increasingly competing against legal process outsourcers (LPO), who
provide the same staffing and process services for large legal transactions
and litigation matters, yet accomplish it with foreign lawyers.132 In terms of
tracking industry trends, this creates difficulties for us because only the
domestic component of a global supply chain will appear in a dataset like
County Business Patterns.133 So, an increase of 14,000 domestic workers in
the All Other Legal Services subsector may actually correspond to a much
larger multiple when the global workforce is considered.
One of the most well-known LPOs is Pangea3, which was started in
2003 by a U.S. lawyer and his Indian-American M.B.A. counterpart with
$1.5 million in venture capital funding.134 The company was subsequently
purchased by Thomson Reuters (NYSE symbol: TRI) in 2010 for a deal
rumored to be worth between $35–40 million.135 At the time, the company
127. Investor Center, ROBERT HALF INT’L, http://www.rhi.com/InvestorCenter (last visited Sept.
30, 2012).
128. About Special Counsel, SPECIAL COUNSEL, http://www.specialcounsel.com/about-specialcounsel/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2012).
129. Id.
130. Who We Are and What We Do, ADECCO GROUP, http://www.adecco.com/enUS/About/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2012).
131. Office Locations, SPECIAL COUNSEL, http://www.specialcounsel.com/locations/ (last visited
Sept. 30, 2012).
132. See Rachel M. Zahorsky, Vendor or Competitor? Pangea3 Purchase Pleases Some, Worries
Others, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 1, 2011, 1:50 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
vendor_or_competitor.
133. See County Business Patterns, CENTER FOR TRANSP. RES. & EDUC.,
http://www.ctre.iastate.edu/research/bts_wb/cd-rom/employment/cbp.htm (last visited Sept. 30,
2012).
134. Anuj Agrawal, In Conversation: Sanjay Kamlani and David Perla, co-CEO’s of Pangea3,
BAR & BENCH (Jun. 27, 2012), http://barandbench.com/brief/4/2540/1/in-conversation-sanjaykamlani-and-david-perla-co-ceos-of-pangea3 (reporting on growth of LPO from a start-up in 2004 to
850 lawyers currently and projected growth of 40% to 60% per year).
135. See Thomson Reuters Acquires Indian Legal Outsourcing Co. Pangea3, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 18,
2010, 4:25 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/report_thomson_reuters_to_acquire_
indian_legal_outsourcing_co_pangea3/.
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had $25 million in annual revenue and electronic discovery was reported to
be its “biggest piece of business.”136 Thomson Reuters maintained the
company’s management team after the acquisition.137 With core operations
in Mumbai, additional facilities in Dehli, India, and Dallas, Texas, and
corporate headquarters in New York City,138 Pangea3 has consistently grown
between 40% and 60% per year.139 It now employs over 850 lawyers
worldwide, and the company expects its historical growth rate to continue
for the next several years.140
The Pangea3 growth rate is slightly ahead of the 30% pace reported by
Mindcrest, a U.S.-based LPO with 600 attorneys in the United States and
India.141 Mindcrest was founded by a former partner at McGuireWoods, an
Am Law 200 firm. Other companies operating in this space include
UnitedLex, which does e-discovery work along with contract and
intellectual property portfolio management.142 Recently, UnitedLex was
listed on the Inc. magazine’s list of the 500 Fastest Growing Private
Companies, with sales growth of 1,287% over three years.143 UnitedLex has
750 employees, including 650 in India.144 CPA Global is another LPO that
does work in document review, legal research, patent portfolios, and
trademark renewals. It employs 1,500 people in 17 locations throughout the
world.145 In early 2012, CPA Global was acquired by Cinven, a European
private equity firm.146 A fourth large company in this space is Huron
Consulting Group, a publicly traded company (NASDAQ symbol: HURN)147
136. Agrawal, supra note 134.
137. Id.
138. See About Us, PANGEA3, http://www.pangea3.com/about/company-overview.html (last
visited Sept. 30, 2012).
139. Agrawal, supra note 134.
140. Id.
141. Aesha Datta, Fresh Law Grads Find Yet Another Avenue in Legal Process Outsourcers, THE
HINDU BUS. LINE (May 11, 2012), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-andeconomy/article3408624.ece?ref=wl_opinion.
142. See generally UNITEDLEX, http://www.unitedlex.com/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
143. See Press Release, UnitedLex, UnitedLex Makes Inc. Magazine's 2012 Inc. 500 List of the
Nation's
Fastest-Growing
Private
Companies
(Aug.
21,
2012),
available
at
http://www.unitedlex.com/pr_inc500_082112.shtml.
144. See UnitedLex Expects 80% Revenue Growth this Fiscal, THE ECON. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2012,
4:45 PM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-01-22/news/30652828_1_unitedlexanayltics-clients.
145. Press Release, CPA Global, Cinven to Acquire CPA Global (Jan. 18, 2012),
http://www.cpaglobal.com/media_centre/press_releases/5046/cinven_to_acquire_cpa_global
(reporting on locations of CPA Global).
146. Id.
147. See generally HURON CONSULTING GROUP, http://www.huronconsultinggroupusa.com/ (last
visited Nov. 11, 2012).
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which recently issued a press release announcing a new document review
and data operations facility in Gurgeon, India (a booming suburb of
Delhi).148 The press release reads, “The Company offers around-the-clock
global discovery support with 1,500 seats at nine locations across the U.S.,
U.K., and India to address clients’ complex business needs.”149 Huron
Consulting Group’s revenues have increased from $314.6 million in 2007 to
$606.3 million in 2011.150
Although the legal market is terrible for law graduates in the United
States,151 the market is booming for Indian law graduates.152 Why? Because
LPOs are growing very rapidly and competing with the traditional Indian
legal employers.153 Although we might be tempted to assume these jobs are
highly repetitive and mundane, that may not be the case.154 As the LPOs
have become larger, more sophisticated, more stable, and more global in
reach, the competitive advantage has begun to switch from labor arbitrage to
process engineering.155 In a May 2012 story in the Hindu Business Line, an
Indian law professor was quoted, “There is a rising trend of students opting
for LPOs. The nature of work is changing and these places offer good
packages and work culture. Moreover, I believe, promotions also come
faster in LPOs.”156
The attractiveness of LPOs is corroborated by the experience of
Pangea3, which had a retention rate of 94% after its first year of operation.157
David Perla, a Penn Law grad and co-CEO of Pangea3, recently remarked to
an Indian publication:
[E]very year you see surveys about how law students perceive
LPOs and every year you see more and more law students saying “I
view an LPO as a good career opportunity.” Today I think it is up
to 50 or 60 percent of law students looking at LPOs as a possible
148. See Press Release, Huron Consulting Group, Huron Consulting Group Expands Global EDiscovery Offerings with India Document Review and Data Operations Facility (July 17, 2012),
http://ir.huronconsultinggroup.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=180006&p=RssLanding&cat=news&id=17152
46.
149. Id.
150. See Huron Consulting Group Fact Sheet, HURON CONSULTING GROUP 1 (2012),
http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/library/Huron_factsheet.pdf.
151. See Joe Palazzolo, Law Grads Face Brutal Job Market, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2012, 10:18
AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100001424052702304458604577486623469958142.html.
152. See Mihaela Papa & David B. Wilkins, Globalization, Lawyers, and India: Toward a
Theoretical Synthesis of Globalization Studies and the Sociology of the Legal Profession, 18 INT’L.
J. LEGAL PROF., no. 3, 2011 at 175, 175.
153. Id. at 187.
154. See Alex Hamilton & Kevin Colangelo, Making LPO Work, OUTSOURCE MAG. (July 3,
2012), http://outsourcemagazine.co.uk/articles/item/4579-making-lpo-work.
155. See Papa & Wilkins, supra note 152, at 180.
156. Datta, supra note 141.
157. Agrawal, supra note 134.
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career opportunity. This is quite substantial in 5 years where they
might have perceived it as “another call centre”.158
These developments should get our attention. The work Perla is
describing is formerly labor-intensive work that has traditionally been
performed by entry-level United States law school graduates.159 It is now
being done by Indian law graduates, who are learning how to design and
operate processes that extract useful information from large masses of digital
text. Not only are the Indian law graduates getting the employment, they are
learning valuable skills that are entirely—entirely—absent from U.S. law
schools. A recent article in Managing Partner magazine acknowledged that
LPOs are taking market share away from U.S. law firms, as more general
counsel instruct LPOs directly.160 Savings are perceived to be in the 50%
range.161 According to the story, legal process outsourcing is currently a $1
billion industry and “is forecast to double in size in the next two to three
years.”162
Another industry that reflects Susskind’s view of the future is the
emerging industry loosely called “predictive coding.”163 In essence, it is
machine algorithms partially replacing humans altogether in the search for
relevant information.164 Because of the massive explosion of digital data,
where so much of our daily lives is encoded into emails, text messages,
internal knowledge management platforms designed to replace email, and
digitized voice mail, the scope of discovery in civil or white collar litigation
has become prohibitively expensive using traditional methods of review.165
In a recent federal court decision, United States Magistrate Judge
Andrew J. Peck ruled that a predictive coding algorithm was, on the facts
before him, an acceptable substitute for manual review.166 Judge Peck
favorably cited one study that compared two computer algorithms against
human review, finding that the two computer searches were at least as
158. Id.
159. See Papa & Wilkins, supra note 152, at 184.
160. See Law Firms Are Losing Work to LPO Providers, MANAGING PARTNER (Sept. 3, 2012),
http://www.managingpartner.com/news/business-strategy/law-firms-are-losing-work-lpo-providers.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Melissa Whittingham, Edward H. Rippey & Skye L. Perryman, Predictive Coding: EDiscovery Game Changer?, EDDE J., Sep. 23, 2011, at 11.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 14 (discussing the potential price structure of predictive coding services).
166. See Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC), 2012 WL 607412, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012) (recognizing that “computer-assisted review is an acceptable way to search
for relevant ESI in appropriate cases”).
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accurate as lawyers.167 Judge Peck also favorably cited another study, which
found that “[t]he technology-assisted reviews require, on average, human
review of only 1.9% of the documents, a fifty-fold savings over exhaustive
manual review.”168 The combination of accuracy and cost made predictive
coding judicially reasonable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which
mandates the courts “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination”
of lawsuits.169 Judge Peck’s decision has been designated as a landmark
ruling by some members of the legal press.170
Companies operating in the predictive coding space include
Recommind, which specializes in e-discovery, compliance, and information
management.171 It explicitly offers “products” for searching and analyzing
large volumes of information.172 Recommind has approximately $15 million
in annual revenues and approximately 100 employees spread over facilities
in Massachusetts, California, London, Germany, and Australia.173 Kroll
Ontrack is another e-discovery company that offers predictive coding. Kroll
Ontrack, which started as a hard disk recovery service, evolved into the ediscovery and information management services.174 It now employs 1,500
workers in eleven U.S. and nineteen foreign locations around the world. In
2010, Kroll Ontrack had revenues of $250 million. Kroll Ontrack is a
subsidiary of Kroll Inc., which is a global risk consulting firm.175 Kroll Inc.
was recently acquired by Altegrity, which is a conglomerate that owns a
series of companies specializing in information management.176 Altegrity is
owned by the Providence Equity Partners, a private equity fund with over

167. See Da Silva Moore, 2012 WL 607412, at *9 & n.11 (citing Herbert L. Roitblatt, Anne
Kershaw, & Patrick Oot, Document Categorization in Legal Electronic Discovery: Computer
Classification v. Manual Review, 61 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 70, 79 (2010)).
168. Id. at 9 (quoting Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, Technology-Assisted Review in
E-Discovery Can Be More Effective and More Efficient Than Exhaustive Manual Review, 17 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 11, 43 (2011)).
169. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
170. See Allison Frankel, In E-Discovery Breakthrough, Judge Endorse ‘Predictive Coding,” On
the Case, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT, Feb. 27, 2012, available at
http://newsandinsight.thompsonreuters.com/Legal/News/ViewNews.aspx?id=40579&terms=@Reute
rsTopicCodes+CONTAINS+’ANV’ (referring to Judge Peck’s ruling as a “landmark e-discovery
decision”).
171. See generally RECOMMIND, http://www.recommind.com/ (last visited Sep. 30, 2012).
172. Id.
173. See InsideView, RECOMMIND, INC., http://www.insideview.com/directory/recommind-inc
(last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
174. See History, KROLLONTRACK.COM, http://www.krollontrack.com/company/history/ (last
visited Sept. 30, 2012).
175. See Overview, KROLL ONTRACK, http://www.krollontrack.com/company/overview (last
visited Oct. 3, 2012).
176. See Aaref Hilaly, What’s Next for Kroll Ontrack?, E-DISCOVERY 2.0 (June 8, 2010, 12:31
PM), http://www.clearwellsystems.com/e-discovery-blog/2010/06/08/what%E2%80%99s-next-forkroll-ontrack/ (reporting sale price of $1.13 billion for Kroll, Inc.).
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$27 billion under management.177
Finally, outside the realm of sophisticated corporate clients, it is worth
mentioning LegalZoom, which supplies legal forms and simple instructions
for a variety of legal needs, including business formation, employment
agreements, tax forms, trademark registration, copyright registration,
provisional applications for patents, real estate leases, and more.178
LegalZoom recently filed its S-1 registration statement with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in anticipation of going
public.179 According to the S-1, the company has served more than two
million customers since its founding in 2002.180 The filing reports that in
2011, nine of ten of its surveyed customers said they would recommend
LegalZoom to their friends and family (and remember, this is in a disclosure
document subject to federal securities law).181 Last year, 20% of all
California limited liability companies were formed using Legal Zoom.182
Indeed, in conjunction with the Pepperdine Law Review symposium that
solicited this Essay, I found myself in a rental car in southern California
during the spring of 2012. The radio was tuned to the Jim Rome Show,
which is syndicated on over 200 stations nationwide. During several hours
of driving, I probably heard a dozen commercials for LegalZoom (I never
changed the channel because I had never heard legal advertising at anywhere
near this scale). According to the SEC filing, the company had $156 million
in revenue in 2011 and $12 million in profit.183 It is seeking $120 million in
funding for general corporate purposes.184
At least for me, Richard Susskind’s ideas are no longer an abstraction.
All of the companies discussed above are profiting from the migration away
from bespoke legal work. As I reflect upon the array of nonlawyer talent
and capital that has assembled itself into formidable, rapidly growing
companies, I have a difficult time identifying a realistic stopping point that
will preserve a domain exclusively for artisan lawyers—i.e., the type of
training that U.S. law schools ostensibly provide. It appears that everything

177. About Us, PROVIDENCE EQUITY, http://www.provequity.com/about-us (last visited Oct. 3,
2012).
178. Our Products & Services, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/products-andservices.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
179. See LegalZoom.com, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (May 10, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1286139/000104746912005763/a2209299zs-1.htm.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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up until the courthouse door, or the moment when legal advice is
communicated from the counselor to the client, is an entry point for a legal
service vendor to become part of the global legal industry supply chain. The
debate over Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4, which prohibits feesplitting with nonlawyers,185 is largely a farce.186 Rule 5.4 is not keeping
nonlawyers out of the legal industry. Rather, it is a mental fence that keeps
lawyers and law professors from venturing out and understanding how the
world is changing around us.
III. A BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE
As discussed in Part II, we, the legal professoriate, are facing
enormously serious structural problems that are likely to accelerate in the
years to come. These can be summarized as follows: (1) our costs are high
and relatively fixed;187 (2) the market for traditional legal jobs appears to
have plateaued;188 (3) we have excess industry capacity, with a need to fill
45,000 1L seats each year;189 (4) we are almost entirely dependent on
federal loans originated by the U.S. Department of Education, which
exposes us to political winds associated with student indebtedness and
repayment rates;190 (5) as predicted by Richard Susskind, law is in the early
stages of a profound and massively disruptive information revolution.191
As formidable as these challenges might be, I would maintain that our
biggest challenge is managing ourselves. We, the tenured law faculty,
control two of the most important components of any law school’s strategy:
hiring and curriculum.
We have inexperience in making difficult
institutional choices and tremendous muscle memory that pulls us back
toward the illusory comfort of the status quo. Setting new priorities in this
environment is mentally and emotionally exhausting. Further, it is made all
the more difficult by the uncertainty regarding incentive and status
185. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1983).
186. See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, IBM General Counsel: Nonlawyer Ownership Is a Nonstarter,
WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Feb. 14, 2012, 2:22 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/02/14/ibmgeneral-counsel-nonlawyer-ownership-is-a-nonstarter/ (discussing practicing bars opposition to any
attempt to enable nonlawyers to own equity in law firms, including proposed changes by the ABA
Ethics 20/20 Commission); see also Chris Bonjean, ISBA Submits Resolution Regarding ABA’s
Ethics 20/20, ILL. STATE BAR ASSOC. (Jun. 20, 2012), http://iln.isba.org/blog/2012/06/20/isbasubmits-resolution-regarding-abas-ethics-2020 (reporting on resolution by the Illinois State Bar
Association, modeled on a 2000 ABA resolution, that “law firms shall not be owned by non-lawyers
and legal fees shall not be shared with non-lawyers”).
187. See supra Part II.B and text accompanying note 92.
188. See supra Part II.B and Figure 2.
189. See supra Part II.B and Figure 4. As noted earlier, based on 1L admissions in the fall of
2010, the spring of 2012 will graduate the largest class in the history of U.S. legal education. See
supra note 64 and accompanying text.
190. See notes 63–92 and accompanying text; see also notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
191. See supra Part II.C.
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structures. Who is going to bear the costs of retooling? Is scholarly
productivity still going to be major part of the reward structure? If scholarly
promise is not going to be the primary hiring criteria, what criteria will
replace it? These are difficult questions. But, if an institution is going to get
itself to safer ground, the answers, and compromises, have to be based on a
realistic assessment of the future.
Each law faculty will need to formulate, then adopt and execute, its own
blueprint for change. After many months of reflection, I have formulated a
blueprint for change that is comprised of three concrete steps that I believe
would help any law school navigate this difficult journey. These three steps
are as follows:
(1) Build consortia of law schools that can reliably pull together
information, resources, and expertise for the purpose of large-scale
collaborations focused on labor market outcomes. These consortia
should be built in conjunction with alumni and employers, who are
themselves looking for resources and venues that help them
successfully adapt to a rapidly changing legal marketplace.192
(2) Use the economies of scale and scope of a consortium to begin the
process of constructing a competency-based curriculum that enables
students to enter traditional law practice, the Susskind processdriven world,193 or a third alternative identified and targeted by the
law school.
(3) Implement a realistic allocation of the retooling burden—what I call
the “12% solution.”
These steps will be discussed in order in the following three sections of
Part III.
A. Consortium of Law Schools Focused on Labor Market Outcomes
In Part II, I stated that the financial viability of law schools depends
upon three interrelated factors: (a) students wishing to enroll, (b) an ability
to pay, and (c) professional employment at graduation. Of these factors,

192. Note to Deans: A task-based or mission-based consortium is an effective way to reach out to
alumni and employers. It has been my experience that lawyers will support these initiatives with
both time and money.
193. See supra Part II.C.
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professional employment is the most important because, if present, the first
two factors will take care of themselves. Building a pipeline to desirable
professional employment is a complicated undertaking. Further, for some of
my colleagues, this proposal is going to smack of vocational training, which
is a serious criticism that warrants a serious response. Therefore, in this
section, I address both the complexity issue and the vocationalism critique.
With that explanation in mind, I want to be very explicit about the
engine that underlies my Blueprint for Change. It is labor market outcomes.
A simple, stylized example illustrates their importance. Imagine students
from Law School A, who have the benefit of a competency-based
curriculum, and students from rival Law School B, who receive a traditional
legal education that is unstructured after the 1L year. Now consider legal
employers in the current economic environment, who are under enormous
and unprecedented economic pressure.194 If graduates of Law School A, as a
group, consistently outperform graduates of Law School B, graduates of
Law School A will over time receive a disproportionate share of the
available employment opportunities. Because law students want to be
heavily pursued by employers, Law School A also receives a
disproportionate share of law school applications. In short, Law School A
would enjoy market power in both the admissions and employments sides of
its operations.195
Changing employer behavior is complicated, particularly in the legal
market, where reliance on an ingrained prestige hierarchy produced a
century of steadily growing profits.196 But as discussed in Part II, those
underlying economic conditions are undergoing dramatic change. That is
our opening. Yet, it is much too big a job for a single law school. Changing
employer behavior requires (1) a lot of current knowledge on the legal
marketplace, (2) deep relationships with legal employers who are willing to
experiment, (3) an agreed upon specification of high performance, (4) a
critical mass of law professors willing to build and teach a curriculum
designed to produce high performers, and (5) a reliable system of
measurement that can quantify the value-add. I doubt any one law school
has the resources and personnel to accomplish this at a world class level. A
194. See Henderson, Three Generations, supra note 6, at 381 (discussing how forces of supply
and demand have dramatically shifted in favor of large corporate clients and that this imbalance is
reshaping the legal marketplace).
195. Such market power is currently enjoyed by the elite national law schools. But is it
warranted? At least some legal employers fighting over market share will be willing to look at the
data. Cf. William D. Henderson, Law Firm Strategies for Human Capital: Past, Present, Future, in
52 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 73, 100 (Austin Sarat ed., 2010) (discussing coming
battle over market share among large U.S. law firms and necessity of firms to reexamine their human
capital strategies in order to compete).
196. See id. at 74 (attributing lack of innovation in human capital strategies to a perennial rise in
private practice incomes and historical reliance on national law schools and noting, “If the model is
not broken, the adage runs, why fix it?”).
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consortium of law schools, in contrast, would have a much better shot.
Over the last several decades, as law schools have become increasingly
embedded inside universities, law professors have bristled at the thought of
education and training that was designed to meet the needs of the
marketplace.197 I have three responses to this perspective.
First, the types of education that will attain the highest valuation are
complex problem-solving skills that enable law school graduates to
communicate and collaborate in a highly complex, globalized environment.
This is not vocational training; it is the creation of a new model of
professional education that better prepares our graduates for the daunting
political and economic challenges ahead. And it should be obvious that as a
group, we legal academics lack these skills ourselves. Although we could
fix that. The consortium would provide the resources to retool.
Second, we academics are on thin ground when we claim that we must
operate apart from market influences in order to develop critical thinking
among our students. Many colleagues are likely to argue that law is the
primary mechanism for controlling the negative externalities of market
forces and market failures; therefore, it is worrisome when legal education is
designed with an eye toward the marketplace.
This critique has undeniable merit, but it should not be controlling.
Whether we like it or not, we already operate within a market. Indeed, for
the last several decades, there has been a vibrant lateral market for law
professors that has ratcheted up law professor salaries.198 Virtually every
law dean in the nation has had the experience of being asked to “meet the
market” to retain his or her most well-known and productive faculty
members. Indeed, it is now conventional wisdom that the best way to
receive a large pay increase is to obtain a lateral offer from a rival law
school. Further, within the university, our higher base salaries are justified
based on the opportunity cost of private practice income. At the same time,
there is a glut in the market for entry level law graduates. Further, virtually
all lack the skills needed to differentiate themselves or to be economically
valuable to an employer or client without additional training. We cannot
credibly accept the benefits of market forces without also accepting the
burdens.
197. According to historian Robert Stevens, this has been a persistent tension in university-based
legal education. See STEVENS, supra note 13, at 209-211, 264-65 (discussing the resistance to socalled “Hessian training” by the professoriate trying to establish the primacy of scholarship with the
nation’s leading law schools).
198. See, e.g., Clayton P Gillette, Law School Faculty as Free Agents, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES
213, 214-19 (2008) (observing at least widespread perceptions that lateral movement is more
common and has likely increased salaries for both mobile and less mobile faculty members).
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This brings us to the third reason we need to focus on labor market
outcomes: As discussed in Part II.A, lack of professional employment for
graduates is the economic force that could put many law schools out of
business. Simply stated, the market for traditional legal education is drying
up. Yet, legal problems and issues remain. An education that is attuned to
this changing marketplace is a valuable education. Further, in addition to a
private sector market benefit, such an education is likely to also include the
knowledge and skills needed to govern and regulate within a complex,
globalized world.
It may be useful to step back for a moment and ask ourselves the true
nature of legal education’s current problems. Some might argue that it is
excessively high tuition and debt. I agree these are serious issues, but not
the most serious. I believe the most serious problem is inadequate quality.199
We can do a lot more with three years of time and $120,000 plus in tuition
per student. Moreover, as a matter of public welfare, our society needs these
problem-solvers.
This is the type of large gap that only a consortium of law schools
would be able to fill. The purpose of such a body is to pool together (a)
alumni networks, which encompass a wide range of high quality employers,
and (b) the enthusiastic and innovative faculty members from several
schools. Outside of the purview of ordinary faculty governance, this group
of willing legal educators would have the resources and latitude to create the
type of curriculum and teaching methods that could attract the interest and
allegiance of employers who are themselves locked into their own fierce
battle for market share.
This cooperative effort might begin as a consortium-based summer
program for underemployed law students during their first or second
summer of law school. If the program is met with enthusiasm by students
and employers, it could be migrated to consortium-based 2L and 3L
programs. As other law faculty see concrete evidence of the success of the
program and have an opportunity to observe its teaching methods, the
consortium innovations can be repatriated and scaled back to the home law
schools.
The consortium approach has several advantages regarding scale and
scope. But its biggest contribution may be sidestepping intractable issues of
faculty governance. Unlike curricular reform at the school level, which is
often characterized as being long on discussion and short on actual

199. Cf. William D. Henderson & Rachel Zahorsky, The Pedigree Problem: Are Law School Ties
Choking
the
Profession?
A.B.A.
J.,
(July
1
2012,
4:20
AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_pedigree_problem_are_law_school_ties_choking_t
he_profession/ (presenting evidence that the labor market’s obsession with prestige—not just large
law firms, but also federal judges, federal agencies, and public interest organizations—inhibits
innovation in legal education).
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change,200 a dean has the latitude to commit one or two enthusiastic faculty
members to a consortium effort that will build and experiment with new
approaches to legal education. More significantly, the resulting consortium
faculty would be a veritable dream team for rapid trial-and-error innovation.
Within one or two years, the consortium moves from ideas to actual results.
And, if it works, results are successes that resonate with students, employers,
and alumni. Within each law school faculty, these successes are likely to
produce converts to the new approach and accelerate the overall rate of
adoption, especially if the current economic climate for law school graduates
continues.
Finally, there is nothing in the consortium approach described above
that would urge a law school not to experiment with its own non-consortium
initiatives. Rather, the consortium approach brings to bear the greatest
amount of talent and resources with the fewest number of institutional
roadblocks. Indeed, if a law school dean has a handful of faculty members
who are willing to commit to it, it becomes a relatively low-cost hedging
strategy that is worth pursuing.
B. A Competency-Based Curriculum
The key to moving an entry level labor market is clarity between
educators and employers on the requisite knowledge, skills, values, and
behaviors that amount to high performance. Very few legal employers,
including law firms, government agencies, and corporate legal departments,
have analyzed their human capital in a sophisticated way.201 Therefore, in
most cases, a dialogue on this topic will be strategic and mutually
advantageous for all parties involved. After defining the criteria for high

200. See, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, Some Thoughts on Law School Curriculum Reform: Scaling
the Mountainside, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 641 (1995) (analogizing the law school curriculum to a
mountainside that changes at a very slow pace).
201. A handful of law firm partners and law firm professional development practitioners
comprise the field. See, e.g., SCOTT WESTFAHL, YOU GET WHAT YOU MEASURE: LAWYER
DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORKS & EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS (NALP 2008) (authored
by Director of Professional Development at Goodwin Proctor); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, FAIR MEASURE:
TOWARD EFFECTIVE ATTORNEY EVALUATIONS (ABA Commission on Women in the Profession, 2d
ed. 2008); HEATHER BOCK & ROBERT RUYAK, CONSTRUCTING CORE COMPETENCIES: USING
COMPETENCY MODELS TO MANAGE FIRM TALENT (ABA 2006) (authored by Managing Partner and
Head of Professional Development at the now defunct Howrey LLP law firm); PETER B. SLOAN,
FROM CLASSES TO COMPETENCIES, LOCKSTEPS TO LEVELS: HOW ONE LAW FIRM DISCARDED
LOCKSTEP ASSOCIATE ADVANCEMENT & REPLACED IT WITH AN ASSOCIATE LEVEL SYSTEM (2007)
(authored by partner at Blackwell Sanders). That said, in my experience working with legal service
organizations, a well-designed system only becomes effective when it is properly executed. This
requires leadership and attention to culture and incentive structures.
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performance, the shared goal should be the creation of measurably better
law school graduates. With adequate measurement, both employers and
educators can ascertain the value of the specialized curriculum. This has the
potential to change the current focus from cost (“legal education is too
expensive”) to value (“we want to hire more of your graduates because they
perform better on the job”).
What I am advocating is the creation of a competency-based curriculum.
In a competency-based curriculum, we identify the knowledge, skills,
behaviors, and attributes of highly successful professionals—lawyers and
nonlawyers—and then work backwards.202 This can be summarized in five
sequential steps:
(1) In conjunction with a group of alumni and employers pulled
together through a consortium of law schools, identify examples of
professional excellence in both the new and old legal economies.
(2) Break these examples into discrete domains of knowledge, skills,
and behaviors, identifying both the overlaps and distinctive features
of specific practice areas. Industrial and organizational psychology
provides the methodology, which has been applied in virtually all
industries.203
(3) Use the iterative process of theory and data to determine the most
effective ways to sequence and teach the requisite knowledge,
skills, behaviors, and competencies.204
(4) Measure the post-graduate performance of students who have had
the benefit of this education (a summer program that eventually
evolves into a curricular program at individual law schools) against
the post-graduate performance of law students who received a
traditional J.D. education.
(5) Build feedback loops on the student, faculty, and employer
experience, evaluate program and repeat. Yes, that’s right, repeat.
Version 1.0 won’t be nearly good enough.

202. In the adult learning literature, this process is akin to the creation of an “impact map,” which
works backward from outcome to measurement, action, and required skill or knowledge. See, e.g.,
ROBERT O. BRINKERHOFF & ANNE M. APKING, HIGH IMPACT LEARNING: STRATEGIES FOR
LEVERAGING BUSINESS RESULTS FROM TRAINING ch. 4 (2001).
203. See, e.g., LYLE M. SPENCER, JR. & SIGNE M. SPENCER, COMPETENCE AT WORK: MODELS
FOR SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE (1993).
204. See id. at 153–155.
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The above five-step process contains a critical assumption: that
students’ professional potential is not substantially fixed by incoming
academic credentials. Stated another way, it is possible for a student who
receives three years of an outstanding competency-based education to obtain
a permanent, sustainable advantage over a more academically qualified
student who received a traditional—and therefore largely unstructured—
legal education.205 If an educational program can produce a measurable
value-add that another school cannot reliably produce, employers will seek
out the graduates of such a program; students will seek out admission; and
alumni will want to contribute time and money toward its construction and
improvement.
A real world example of transformative education is the late Randy
Pausch’s Entertainment Technology Center at Carnegie Mellon
University.206 The Center supervised a two-year masters degree that taught
students how to combine art with technology in pursuit of entertainment.207
The massive creativity that this program generated led to companies making
three year commitments to hire its graduates.208 As Pausch wrote, this meant
that employers “were promising to hire people we hadn’t even admitted
yet.”209
No doubt, some would argue that law is different.210 In my experience,
many law professors believe in the determinative power of general
intelligence—that is, the quality of one’s legal education cannot significantly
reorder the sorting of quality of innate ability (LSAT and undergraduate
credentials) that occurs in the admissions process.211 As one law professor
once told me, “I can’t teach ‘smart.’” For educators in this group, a

205. See id. at Part V.
206. See RANDY PAUSCH, THE LAST LECTURE 124 (2008).
207. Program Overview, ENTERTAINMENT TECHNOLOGY CENTER CARNEGIE MELLON,
http://www.etc.cmu.edu/site/program/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
208. See PAUSCH, supra note 206, at 125.
209. Id.
210. See Jason A. Smith, Training Individuals in Public Health Law, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 50, 52–53 (2008). (“Competency-based training is foreign to legal education and
practice. . . . Formal legal education is fundamental to learning.”).
211. At least one scholar has made the observation that U.S. News & World Report rankings do
not measure educational quality; rather, the primary function of ranking is to sort the quality of raw
material. See Russell Korobkin, Harnessing the Positive Power of Rankings: A Response to Posner
and Sunstein, 81 IND. L.J. 35, 40–43 (2006) [hereinafter Korobkin, Harnessing] (observing that
rankings don’t assess educational quality by providing a market-clearing device that enables top law
students and legal employers to identify each other, thus augmenting “employment opportunities and
. . . long-term earning potential” for prospective law school applicants); see also Russell Korobkin,
Essay, In Praise Of Law School Rankings: Solutions To Coordination And Collective Action
Problems, 77 TEX. L. REV. 403, 407–14 (1998).
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competency-based curriculum is unlikely to hold much appeal.212 The
quality of the input compromises and largely predetermines the quality of
the output.
That said, it is not a productive use of our time to debate whether this
worldview is correct.213 How much value a competency-based curriculum
can add, if any, is an empirical question that needs to be answered with
data.214 We answer this question by building such a curriculum and
observing the results; the control group will be comprised of the large
number of law schools who lack the leadership and imagination to break
from the status quo.215 It is just that simple.
There is a paucity of high quality empirical research on the factors that
contribute to lawyer effectiveness.216 But what little evidence there is
suggests that academic indicators are less important than what some of us
law professors might believe.217
The leading study on this topic was conducted by Professors Marjorie
Shultz and Sheldon Zedeck of the University of California at Berkeley.218
The study was partially inspired by the passage of Proposition 209 in the
mid-1990s, which made it illegal for California state colleges and
universities to use racial preferences in their admissions.219 Based on twenty
years of teaching experience at U.C. Berkeley Law, Professor Shultz was
skeptical that the admissions criteria used for admission to law school—the
LSAT and undergraduate GPA (UGPA), which have significant racial
performance disparities—were valid and reliable predictors of future success

212. See generally Korobkin, Harnessing, supra note 211 (discussing the value of law school
rankings as a logical coordination system and arguing that faculty scholarship, the traditional
approach to legal education, is one of the most important factors for the ranking system).
213. For my view on the potential of legal education to transform, see Henderson & Zahorsky,
The Pedigree Problem, supra note 199 (reviewing evidence that law school pedigree fails to predict
success as a lawyer).
214. In his recent best-selling book, the Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman marshals a wealth of
research to document humankind’s propensity toward overconfidence. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN,
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW chs. 19–24 (2011). We don’t bother collecting data and testing our
assumptions, because we are so certain we are correct. Id. This propensity produces a relentless
stream of bad decisions. Id.
215. See supra Part III.B.
216. See generally Marjorie Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Identification, Development, and
Validation of Predictors for Successful Lawyering, Final Report (Sept. 2008) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with U.C. Berkeley School of Law, University of California, Berkeley)
[hereinafter Shultz & Zedeck, Identification, Development, and Validation] (demonstrating the lack
of empirical research and analyzing factors that contribute to lawyer effectiveness in an official
report commissioned by LSAC).
217. Id. at 15–18.
218. See Marjorie Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness: Broadening the
Basis for Law School Admissions Decisions, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 620 (2011) [hereinafter Shultz
& Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness].
219. See Shultz & Zedeck, Identification, Development, and Validation, supra note 216, at 66,
n.8; see also CAL. CONST. art. I, §31 (codifying Proposition 209).
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as a practicing lawyer.220 To test this theory, Professor Shultz enlisted the
help of Professor Zedeck, who is one of the nation’s leading industrial and
organizational (IO) psychologists.221
Drawing upon well-established IO psychology empirical methods,
Shultz and Zedeck identified twenty-six lawyer effectiveness factors.222
These factors, which are grouped into eight umbrella categories,223 are
summarized in Figure 9 below.
Figure 9. Shultz and Zedeck Lawyer Effectiveness Factors
Intellectual & Cognitive
• Analysis and Reasoning
• Creativity and Innovation
• Problem Solving
• Practical Judgment
Research & Information Gathering
• Researching the Law
• Fact Finding
• Questioning and Interviewing
Communications
• Influencing and Advocating
• Writing
• Speaking
• Listening
Planning & Organization
• Strategic Planning
• Organizing/Managing One’s Own
Work
• Organizing/Managing Others
(Staff/Colleagues)

Conflict Resolution
• Negotiation Skills
• Able to See the World Through the
Eyes of Others
Client/Business Relations:
Entrepreneurship
• Networking and Business
Development
• Providing Advice and Counsel and
Building Relationships with Clients
Working with Others
• Developing Relationships Within
the Legal Profession
• Evaluation, Development, and
Mentoring
Character
• Passion and Engagement
• Diligence
• Integrity/Honesty
• Stress Management
• Community Involvement and Service
• Self-Development

Part of the Shultz-Zedeck project included the development of
behaviorally anchored scales for measuring performance on a one-to-five
scale on each of the twenty-six effectiveness factors.224 These scales were
empirically derived from extensive lawyer interviews and focus groups and
220. Shultz & Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness, supra note 218, at 623.
221. As evidence of this claim, note that Professor Zedeck is the Editor-in-Chief of the American
Psychological Association’s HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
(2010).
222. See Shultz & Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness, supra note 218, at 630.
223. Id. at 640–41.
224. Id. at 629.
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then tested to ensure their reliability and validity among lawyer evaluators.225
These scales were then used to obtain peer and supervisor evaluations for
1,150 U.C. Berkeley and U.C. Hastings graduates and 200 U.C. Berkeley
alumni who graduated law school between 1973 and 2006.226 These
effectiveness factors were only weakly correlated with student and alumni
LSAT, UGPA, and first-year grades—and some of these correlations were
negative.227 In contrast, other assessment tools were positively and more
strongly correlated with a significantly larger number of effectiveness
factors.228 These nonacademic assessment tools included biographical
information data (positively correlated with twenty-four factors), a
situational judgment test (twenty-three factors), and a well-known off-theshelf Big Five personality test (twenty-two factors).229
Indirectly, the Shultz-Zedeck study also revealed the unduly narrow
scope of the traditional law school curriculum.230 Despite the fact that
nonacademic assessments were useful predictors of actual lawyer
effectiveness, these assessments added no incremental value to predictions
of first-year grades beyond what LSAT and UGPA were already able to
predict.231 Yet, as Shultz and Zedeck pointed out, this negligible predictive
power is likely due to the fact that law school, particularly in the first year,
assesses “a narrow band of cognitive test taking skills,”232 which is a small
fraction of the twenty-six effectiveness factors.
The original purpose of the Shultz-Zedeck study was to develop more
accurate and valid methods for making law school admissions.233 Yet the
study ultimately delivered much more. One of these takeaways is that
traditional academic predictors capture a mere subset of what enables a
lawyer to be effective.234 A second key takeaway is that most of the
225. Id.
226. See id. at 639.
227. Id. at 641 (reporting that only eight out of twenty-six effectiveness factors were positively
correlated at statistically significant levels with the LSAT, ranging from .07 (Problem Solving) to
.15 (Writing); reporting statistically significant negative correlations between LSAT and Networking
and Business Development (-.12) and Community Service (-.10); reporting statistically significant
correlation between UGPA and three effectiveness factors); see also Shultz & Zedeck, Identification,
Development, and Validation, supra note 216 (in student sample, reporting no statistically
significant positive correlations between UPGA and effectiveness factors, but observing a negative
association between Practical Judgment (-.169), Seeing the World Through the Eyes of Others (.170), Developing Relationships (-.195), Integrity (-.189) and Community Service (-.152)) (data
taken from correlation tables in appendices).
228. See Shutlz & Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness, supra note 218, at 634.
229. See id. at 643. The personality assessment was the Hogan Personality Inventory (HPI). The
Hogan Developmental Survey, which focuses on job “derailers,” was meaningfully correlated with
eighteen factors, albeit most negatively.
230. See Shultz & Zedeck, Identification, Development, and Validation, supra note 216, at 88.
231. Id. at 65.
232. See Shutlz & Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness, supra note 218, at 643.
233. See id. at 628.
234. Id. at 641.
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traditional law school curriculum has little or no overlap with most of the
Shultz-Zedeck effectiveness favors.235 Lacking awareness that these factors
are even important, we legal educators spend a lot of time disseminating
substantive legal knowledge and developing a relatively small number of
effectiveness skills.236 As a consequence, we spend virtually no time or
concentrated effort on other skills. Indeed, it is fair to ask whether we law
professors, as a group, have developed many of the requisite effectiveness
factors. Are we good at networking or developing relationship within the
legal profession? Or seeing the world through the eyes of others? Or
strategic planning? As embarrassing as this might seem, these deficits may
be our greatest opportunity.
Building a competency-based curriculum is complicated.237 A single
faculty member cannot design it within the confines of a single essay; it is a
task that, in its first permutation, requires the efforts of a large number of
faculty, social scientists, and practicing lawyers over an extended period of
time. The complexity of a competency-based curriculum is further
compounded by an information revolution that is changing the mix of
current and future jobs. Because of the emphasis on process and technology
now taking hold within the legal industry,238 the practical technical skills and
domain knowledge that might have held us in good stead in 1980 or 1990
may be inadequate for a large proportion of law students graduating in the
year 2015.239
Drawing upon my ongoing research, my experience building
competency-based curricula at Indiana Law, and my related work with law
firms and legal departments, I would offer three guiding principles for
building a competency-based curriculum:
(1) “Practice-Ready” is Not Enough. Despite the rebukes often
received from the practicing bar, for most law schools an emphasis on
“practice-ready” skills will be insufficient to cope with the structural
changes occurring within the legal industry.240 Granted, it is true that better
235. Id.
236. See id. at 623.
237. See SPENCER & SPENCER, supra note 203 (summarizing hundreds of research studies from a
twenty-year time span on competency assessment and application).
238. See supra Part II.C.
239. The IO psychology literature provides some clues on competencies that cut across all
workplaces. See, e.g., SPENCER & SPENCER, supra note 203, at 336 (listing eight factors that
“predict success in work and in life”: achievement orientation, initiative, information seeking,
conceptual thinking, interpersonal understanding, self-confidence, impact and influence, and
collaborativeness).
240. Several practicing lawyers with adjunct professorships in law schools have advocated for a
curriculum that would enable law students to be more practice ready at graduation. See, e.g., Brent
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skills training will enable law school graduates to better compete for the
finite number of traditional legal service jobs that will be available in the
years to come.241 But, to be blunt, in a world that is getting pulled in
Susskind’s continuum from bespoke to commoditized, practice-ready skills
training will not change the total number of traditional legal jobs available to
law school graduates. Moreover, one of greatest dangers of the “practiceready” solution is that we law professors will too readily conclude that we
don’t need to leave the building—that is, engage with the profession and the
industry242— to find a solution. Our schools would just need to hire more
clinicians. Yet, this is a very expensive solution that fails to address the
longer-term systemic employment problems.243
(2) Design and Build It Yourself. What we teach, and how we teach it,
are the key factors that will enable a law school to distinguish itself in the
years to come. Although it might be tempting for a law school committee to
craft something that is based on the landmark Shultz-Zedeck effectiveness
factors,244 or purchased from a consultant, the ultimate work product has to
produce graduates that employers are anxious to hire. This is a design
problem that requires data to effectively construct. We need to know what
to teach and when and how to teach it. Indeed, the fifth and final step in
building a competency-based curriculum is simply “repeat.” This is why
engagement with the legal industry is so critical: We need a reliable
feedback loop. Equally important in the short term is the fact that the
process of designing and building a competency-based curriculum is a
profoundly powerful change management tool.245 With the right leadership,
Evan Newton, The Ninety-Five Theses: Systemic Reforms of the American Legal Education and
Licensure, 64 S.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012); see also Steven C. Bennett, When Will Law School
Change?, 89 NEB. L. REV. 87 (2010); see also Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity Lost: How Law School
Disappoints Law Students, the Public, and the Legal Profession, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 219 (2007). I
applaud the passion and dedication of these lawyers and am sympathetic to many of their critiques.
But, following their prescriptions will not solve our longer term problems.
241. The soft employment market, however, also provides employers with a temptation to
double-down on law school pedigree. See Henderson & Zahorsky, The Pedigree Problem, supra
note 199.
242. See Part III.A.
243. Cf. TAMANAHA, FAILING supra, note 42, at 172–73 (pointing out that the rise of clinical
education reflects the error in abandoning the apprenticeship model but arguing that the clinics are
uneconomical and not a viable solution to legal education’s long-term woes).
244. The Shultz-Zedeck effectiveness factors were not designed to be a working tool for a law
school curriculum. My own experience in both a law school and legal employer context is that
twenty-six factors is too many. An effective competency-based curriculum will simplify these
factors and place them in a sequence and hierarchy to facilitate effective teaching.
245. As noted earlier, change management is a well-established discipline with a deep literature.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text. For a general discussion on change management, see
John P. Kotter, Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 2007, at
96 (articulating and explaining Kotter’s renowned eight principles on organizational change); see
also Fred Nickols, Change Management 101: A Primer, DISTANCE CONSULTING LLC,
http://www.nickols.us/change.htm (last updated Aug. 23, 2012) (accessible overview by a leading
consultant on change management).
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it can also be the basis for a successful law school capital campaign. Again,
engagement with alumni and the legal industry will lead us out of this
maze.246
(3) Alliances with Employers. Law schools have one factor working in
our favor. Legal employers are facing a battle over market share,247 and high
quality professional talent is the solution to their problem. Legal employers
lack the know-how and expertise to solve this problem on their own.
Effective
Further, they too are under enormous cost pressures.248
engagement with the legal industry can and should result in mutually
beneficial collaboration. The value of the third year of law school is now
almost universally questioned.249 Thus, it is ripe for a law school-legal
employer collaboration that drives down costs while accelerating lawyer
development.
C. The 12% Solution
My Blueprint for Change takes a realistic view of how quickly and
dramatically law schools can change. Some faculty members may deny
there is need to change. Others will disagree with the direction I have staked
out here. A third group may like the proposal but conclude that it is too late
in their careers to make a substantial contribution. So let’s begin with a
coalition of the willing. To my mind, 12% of the faculty is enough,
particularly if they are pooled together in a consortium-based working group
as discussed in Part III.A.
Further, as a political matter, let’s stipulate that the blueprint does not
call for the tearing down of legal education as we know it. Instead, we start
with 12% of the curriculum—the equivalent of one course per year—driven
by a small subset the faculty, who are willing and able to take up the
246. See supra Part III.A.
247. See Henderson, Law Firm Strategies, supra note 195 (discussing coming battle over market
share among large U.S. law firms); see also William D. Henderson, From Big Law to Lean Law,
George Mason Law & Economics Symposium (forthcoming) (on file with author) (describing
current battle over market share).
248. See, e.g., Dan DiPietro & Gretta Rusanow, Cost Reduction Is Good, Cost is Certainly Better,
AM. L. DAILY (Dec. 10, 2010, 6:00 AM), http:amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/12/citi3
quarterparttwo.html (“[T]he corporate law department faces pressure internally to reduce its outside
legal costs. General counsel have been open to other options given the availability of offshore legal
service providers, and Am Law Second Hundred firms prepared to offer services at a lower cost than
the traditional law firms.”).
249. See, e.g., Mitu Gulati, Richard Sander & Robert Sockloskie, The Happy Charade: An
Empirical Examination of the Third Year of Law School, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235, 244 (2001)
(among a sample of 1,100 3Ls, the authors “estimate that third-year students at many law schools
attend only around 60 percent of their large classes.”).
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challenge. Because the competencies and learning encompassed by the 12%
will move students substantially further into the noncognitive effectiveness
factors identified by Shultz and Zedeck, this 12% change could immediately
distinguish a school’s graduates from graduates of peer schools. Thereafter,
the 12% would provide a basis for additional investment and learning.
Again, 12% is where we start.
If 12% seems like too high a price, I would direct your attention to two
insurmountable problems with doing less. The first is economic: because of
structural changes occurring in the profession, our business model is
unsustainable.250 The second is moral: we are underserving our students by
permitting them to incur so much educational debt when the education we
offer does not adequately map onto the workplace they are entering.251 The
model of three years of generalist training to become an artisan lawyer is no
longer a realistic or sufficient career preparation for most law graduates.252
The problem here is not the cost of legal education per se; rather, it is the
value of legal education as it is currently constructed.
For the vast majority of law schools, the best solution is to retool.253
Why? To ensure the long term viability of our law schools, our students
need a reliable pathway to high quality professional employment. Focusing
only on traditional legal employment is too risky.254 As discussed in Parts
II.B–C, the number and earning power of these jobs is likely to shrink in the
years to come. Some might argue that law schools should become more
affordable by slashing budgets and increasing teaching loads.255 Although
this might reduce student debt in the short to medium term, it does
nothing—zero—to prepare our students for the changes occurring in the
legal profession and the broader legal industry.256 From my perspective, the
inadequacy of legal education today is a problem at least on par with its high
cost. We need to solve both.
My own belief is that educational quality is the next great frontier. If we
can put a man on the moon in the 1960s, surely with three years and $100K
we can turn a reasonably able and motivated twenty-four-year-old into a
critical thinker who can reliably communicate, collaborate, gather facts,
250. See Richard W. Bourne, The Coming Crash in Legal Education: How We Got Here, and
Where We Go Now, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 651, 651–53 (2012) (raising the issue of “whether the
huge enhancements in legal education in recent years can be sustained”).
251. See id. at 671–85 (discussing the burden of student debt).
252. See id. at 696.
253. This idea was originally discussed in an essay I wrote in a special online series for the
National Law Journal. See William D. Henderson, The Hard Business Problems Facing U.S. Law
Faculty,
NAT’L
L.J.’S
L.
SCH.
REV.
(Oct.
31,
2011,
12:39
PM),
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/lawschoolreview/2011/10/the-hard-business-problems-facing-us-lawfaculty.html.
254. See id.
255. See Bourne, supra note 250, at 692–93.
256. See id. at 695–96.
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assess data, lead, follow, and approach problems with both empathy and
objectivity. Improving quality changes the debate from “how much does my
law degree cost?” to “how much is my law school degree worth?” If the
worth is sufficiently high, I believe both public and private employers would
be willing to subsidize it in exchange for preferred access to graduates.
The only barrier is institutional focus. To make this happen, a law
school—or, more likely, a law school consortium—has to take an “Apollo
Project” approach that focuses purely on education. After figuring out the
“how high” and “how fast” possibilities, an institution could then focus on
controlling costs through process improvements and building modules. First
quality (worth), then cost. This is not trade school education; this is about
fully exploring human potential.257
My 12% solution is an “Apollo Project” approach, albeit with a realist’s
assessment about (a) the complexity of the task before us and (b) how
quickly an organization can change and remain stable and cohesive. Law
schools are filled with highly talented and dedicated professionals who want
to deliver value to their students. But not everyone has the energy and
mindset to begin the iterative process of building a competency-based
curriculum. Many of these competencies that a law school might include—
for example, teamwork, communication skills, emotional self-control,
problem-solving, and decision-making—have to be taught experientially.
And for most of us law professors, creating and executing these types of
teaching plans would be a new skill. Managing student expectations is also
a problem. Students, more than anyone, would prefer the legal profession as
depicted in the popular media. They expect to learn about torts, contracts
and constitutional law. They are unprepared to learn that law is becoming
less about jury trials and courtroom advocacy and more about process
engineering, predictive coding, and the collaborative and technical skills
those processes entail.258
As a practical matter, I would suggest that we begin with a summer
institute between the 2L and 3L years of law school that is created and
staffed by the select group of faculty, alumni, and employers drawn from a
law school consortium.259 What can be accomplished during a ten-week
257. See William D. Henderson, What is the Answer to High Student Debt?, THE LEGAL
WHITEBOARD (May 23, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2012/05/what-isthe-answer-to-high-student-debt.html.
258. Richard Susskind recently remarked that, “I talk to many audiences, nearly all of them
skeptical and conservative. And consistently, the most conservative audiences are law students.”
See William D. Henderson, Why Are We Afraid of the Future of Law?, NAT’L JURIST, Sept. 2012, at
8, 8 (quoting Susskind during a speech given in London in June 2012).
259. There is an immensely practical reason for starting with a summer program that does not
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summer program for 3L law students is approximately equivalent to 12% of
learning in law school. Although the consortium faculty would be charged
with creating the curriculum, in all likelihood it would be entail simulations,
team-based projects, and other forms of experiential learning. The summer
institute would enable a larger number of law professors to observe these
new forms of teaching. If successful, the course materials and assessment
tools developed by the summer institute would begin migrating back to the
law school environment to fill 12% of the actual law school curriculum.
Building and delivering this 12% curriculum will probably require the
efforts of at least 20% of the law school faculty. Let us go with the 20%
who are most willing to accept this challenge—probably many junior
members of the faculty who realize that riding out the clock is just not an
option. The remaining 88% of the curriculum, taught by the remaining 80%
or so of the faculty carrying a slightly heavier teaching load, can be kept
largely intact. This process of building and improving a competency-based
curriculum will have to unfold over a period of years. With some early
successes, the 12% can be expanded to fit the strategic needs of the schools.
But I would advise a simple maxim: crawl, walk, run.
The 12% solution is a plan for law faculty to create school-specific
capital.260 A competency-based curriculum is best executed by the faculty
who created it and who continue to grow and improve it.261 We will be
interdependent upon one another to create the new competency-based
curriculum, and it is this interdependence that will enable us to deliver a
superior education as compared to other law schools staffed by autonomous
teachers and scholars. The price we will pay for this school-specific capital
is likely to mean substantially less time for traditional legal scholarship—the
kind that has historically enabled law professors to obtain a more lucrative
lateral offer at a higher-ranked law school.262

offer law school credit: the entire program would be outside the purview of ABA Accreditation
Standards and law school educational policy committees, yet it could nonetheless transform some
law students into the type of law school graduates that are in short supply. Again, to be successful,
this entire blueprint requires validation by the labor markets.
260. The concept of school-specific capital is based on Gilson’s and Mnookin’s discussion of
firm-specific capital, which is the creation of a resource by partners that can only be profitably
exploited within the firm and thus is not subject to grabbing and leaving. See Ronald J. Gilson &
Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the
Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 353–71 (1985)
(discussing advantages and sources of firm-specific capital); see also William D. Henderson, Law
Professor Free Agency and “School-Specific” Capital, LEGAL PROF. BLOG (Aug. 13, 2008),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legal_profession/2008/08/law-professor-f.html (discussing the
effects of increasing professor mobility on school-specific capital).
261. See Gregory S. Munro, Integrating Theory and Practice in a Competency-Based
Curriculum: Academic Planning at the University of Montana School of Law, 52 MONT. L. REV.
345, 358–63 (1991).
262. See Gillette, supra note 198, at 215.
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Ironically, in terms of scholarship, any law school that succeeds in
creating true school-specific capital would be in a position to make an
enormous contribution to the literature on experiential legal education,
educational assessments, adult learning, teamwork, institutional design and
change management. That said, I realize that this is not the type of work that
many law professors signed up for. If this describes you and your
colleagues, then you likely have some decisions to make. If your law school
embraces a plan that is uncomfortably far away from your vision of legal
education, think long and hard about whether your preferred vision is
economically viable. It may be time to either let go of old ideas or,
alternatively, to move on to other opportunities.
IV. CONCLUSION
The day before I completed this manuscript, I had breakfast with Mark
Chandler, the general counsel of Cisco Systems, Inc, a major publicly traded
technology company. I told Mark about the subject of this essay—that I am
delivering the hard news that the vast majority of law schools either have to
adapt to the new legal marketplace or go out of business. I was focused on
the fear and sadness it might engender for many readers. He, in contrast,
focused on the benefits and innovations that these pressures will soon
produce. “What you are describing is my industry, my job, every day.
Changes in the way knowledge is collected and accessed are affecting all of
us. For everyone but law school deans and professors who refuse to change,
this sounds like wonderful news. So don’t worry about it. Now, what do
you want for breakfast?”
This was a welcomed reality check for me. There is an opportunity
here; an opportunity to do something great. I hope you agree.
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